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One of the most difficult tasks in preparing a poverty reduction strategy
consists in setting priorities for public action, taking into account the cost
of social programs and the capacity of the government to pay that cost.
The ability to pay for social programs essentially is determined by the re-
sources available to the government through taxation and/or loans. Thus,
the issues of debt and fiscal sustainability are key. In this study, we used
SimSIP Debt, a user-friendly, Excel-based tool for analyzing debt and fis-
cal sustainability issues. Our objective was not to suggest policy options
for Paraguay, but to explain how SimSIP Debt can be used to illustrate
various scenarios. The simulator was developed by Gunter et al. (2002)
and it has two modules.1
The Debt Projection Module enables the user to simulate the evolu-
tion of a country’s debt over a 15-year horizon, based on initial conditions
and projections for government expenditures, government revenues, and
other parameters. Reflecting the fact that, for many countries, debt sus-
tainability cannot be determined by only one specific indicator, this mod-
ule adopts a flexible approach to the analysis of debt sustainability. Given
that Paraguay’s concessional debt is a small portion of the country’s total
debt, this study looks at the levels and trends of a variety of nominal debt
sustainability indicators rather than so-called net present value indicators.
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(We will explain later the distinction between an analysis in nominal
terms and in net present value terms.)
The Deficit-Debt Consistency Module presents a variety of matrices to
determine the consistency of a country’s budget deficits with a desired
level of short-term or long-term indebtedness and a variety of gross do-
mestic product (GDP) growth rates. In the case of Paraguay, we look at
such matrices for the nominal debt-to-GDP ratio, the nominal debt-to-
exports ratio, and the nominal debt-to-revenue ratio. Each matrix shows
how various levels of budget deficit relative to GDP ratios are consistent
with both a range of real GDP growth rates and a range of debt targets.
This type of analysis essentially enables the user to assess what level of
budget deficit can be sustained without increasing debt ratios too much.
Before explaining our approach for analyzing debt sustainability, it is
worth describing briefly the evolution of the debt situation in Paraguay.
In 1989, the country’s public external debt amounted to about 50 per-
cent of GDP. Subsequently, the debt dropped significantly as the govern-
ment purchased at a discount a sizable amount of delinquent commercial
debt in the secondary market and rescheduled all remaining commercial
debt arrears. In 1992, the government also paid 100 percent of any re-
maining official debt arrears to France, Germany, Spain, and the United
States. As a result, in the mid-1990s the ratio of external public debt
reached a minimum of about 15 percent. Since then, however, debt lev-
els have been rising again, reaching nearly 30 percent in 2000 (see the an-
nex for the trend in Paraguay’s debt).2
Several factors explain the increase in the country’s debt since the mid-
1990s. The persistent recession observed since 1995 has put pressure on
the amount of revenues collected by the government. Furthermore, be-
tween 1990 and 2000, although revenues increased from 9.5 percent to
11.5 percent of GDP, they remained based primarily on consumption
taxes and royalties from hydroelectric power generation. Together with
the prolonged recession, the limited tax base and instruments available
for taxation have made it difficult for the government to raise revenues,
at least in the short run.
At the same time, public spending has increased substantially, especial-
ly in the social sector. Social spending for education, health care, and so-
cial assistance tripled in per capita terms in the 1990s. It also increased
from one fourth to 40 percent of total spending, and from less than 3 per-
cent to 7 percent of GDP. Expenditures per capita in education more
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than tripled. The increase was largest for primary and secondary educa-
tion, but all levels of schooling benefited. Real expenditures for health
also were increased substantially. In both education and health, most of
the increase took place in the first half of the 1990s, but the effects on the
budget have persisted since that time because the country entered a pro-
longed recession. Expenditures on social security and social assistance also
increased in real terms and as a percentage of GDP, but they decreased as
a share of total spending. Spending for housing, water, and sanitation de-
creased.
It is important to mention that, although Paraguay’s percentage of in-
crease in social spending through the 1990s was larger than in the rest of
Latin America, the levels of social spending-to-GDP remained lower than
those of other countries. Specifically, estimates from the Comisión
Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL 2002) suggested
that the increase in public social spending per capita over the 1990s was
larger in Paraguay (136 percent increase) than in Latin America as a
whole (50 percent increase). Despite Paraguay’s greater increase in
spending, the level of spending remained four times smaller than in other
Latin American countries ($132 per person in Paraguay in 1998–99 ver-
sus $540 in Latin America).As a share of GDP as well, the level of spend-
ing in Paraguay remained comparatively low.3
Still, from a debt sustainability perspective, as a result of the stagnation
in revenues and the increase in spending, the central government went
from a surplus of 2.5 percent of GDP during 1990–94 to a deficit of 
5.5 percent in 2000. Because public sector wages use up most of the
state’s revenues, capital spending has been curtailed and financed with
external funds. As a result, overall, the government has little room to ma-
neuver—for example, to spend more on productive activities or on pover-
ty reduction programs. In the first half of 2001, a better control of public
expenditures was achieved and plans were discussed to increase revenues
(that is, plans for extensions of the value-added tax, higher taxes on to-
bacco and alcohol, and import duty and annual “patent” on cars). That,
however, had no dramatic effect on the current public spending con-
straint—and that is problematic, given the desire to fund new initiatives
to reduce poverty as part of the national poverty reduction strategy pro-
posed by the Ministry of Social Action.
At the time we wrote this report (in 2003), there were contrasting
views on Paraguay’s long-term debt sustainability (as was true for many
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other developing countries), partly because of differences of opinion on
what constitutes debt sustainability and partly because of differences in
macroeconomic assumptions. The government of Paraguay’s investment
promotion Web site states that Paraguay’s debt “does not represent a bur-
den that threatens economic stability” and that “the country’s abundant
foreign reserves guarantee the normal servicing of the debt.” At the same
time, the Economist Intelligence Unit’s country risk summary of October
2002 concluded that “[r]enewed weakness in the guaraní could compro-
mise debt-servicing before long. A weak policymaking environment, poor
economic performance, and recent external shocks could all complicate
the picture. The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) is currently forecast-
ing an external debt/GDP ratio of almost 70% by 2003 as US dollar GDP
shrinks.”4 There also were worries that, given the impact of the recession
in Argentina, fiscal deficits will continue to increase and thus lead to an
unsustainable debt.
Given this controversy, the tools provided in SimSIP Debt can be use-
ful for policy makers and analysts conducting their own analyses. But one
must be careful not to overestimate what one can learn from such mod-
eling. Indeed, the concept of sustainability is very useful—but it also can
be dangerous. When making projections 10 or 15 years ahead, there are
tremendous uncertainties. It may be tempting for a government to base
its strategy on, say, a medium-growth case scenario while ignoring signifi-
cant risks that lower-growth case scenarios may entail. This means that
there are some political economy dangers inherent in using simple fore-
casts and one must be careful about how one treats the uncertainties re-
sulting from them. Although we will not enter into detailed policy dis-
cussions about Paraguay in this report, we do want to emphasize that
debt sustainability is an area of macroeconomic policy where govern-
ments must be especially careful.
To help readers become familiar with the simulator and its assump-
tions, the rest of the report is structured as follows. In the next section we
briefly present a few alternative approaches, concepts, and examples for
analyzing debt sustainability, and we cover the theoretical background for
the two modules of the SimSIP Debt simulator.5 The third and fourth
sections provide preliminary results obtained with the two modules.6 The
report ends with some conclusions and an outlook based on the latest
available data.
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Alternative Approaches to 
Analyzing Debt Sustainability
A common definition of debt sustainability is whether a country can
meet its current and future debt service obligations in full, without re-
course to debt relief, rescheduling, or accumulation of arrears. To deter-
mine if a country’s debt is sustainable is complex, however, and there are
various analytical approaches, as presented in the first chapter of this
book. From a theoretical perspective, perhaps the most appealing ap-
proach is to derive debt sustainability criteria based on discounting the
net present value (NPV) of the government’s debt over an infinite hori-
zon (Buiter 1995; Cuddington 1997). The limitations of this approach,
however, have led to the development of more practical debt sustainabil-
ity indicators, usually based on a ratio of a debt variable to another key
macroeconomic variable.7 Still another approach is to look at the consis-
tency of the government’s budget deficit with the government’s desired
level of indebtedness.
To illustrate the variety of approaches used to analyze debt sustainabil-
ity, we provide below a few examples of indicators used in the World
Bank’s Global Development Finance (GDF), the HIPC Initiative, the Unit-
ed Nations’ Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and the European
Union’s Maastricht Treaty.
The World Bank’s GDF (formerly, World Debt Tables) classifies exter-
nal indebtedness based on two ratios—the ratio of the NPV of total ex-
ternal debt (calculated based on all future debt service) to the three-year
backward-looking average of gross national product (GNP), and the ratio
of the NPV of total external debt (calculated based on all future debt
service) to the three-year backward-looking average of exports of goods
and services (including workers’ remittances). If either ratio exceeds a
critical value—80 percent for the NPV-debt-to-GNP ratio and 220 per-
cent for the NPV-debt-to-exports ratio—the country is classified as se-
verely indebted. If the critical value is not exceeded but either ratio is
three-fifths or more of the critical value (that is, 48 percent for present
value of debt service to GNP and 132 percent for present value of debt
service to exports), the country is classified as moderately indebted. If
both ratios are less than three-fifths of the critical value, the country is
classified as less indebted.
In the framework of the HIPC Initiative, a country is considered to have
a sustainable external debt if the ratio of the present value external debt
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(calculated based on all future debt service) to the three-year backward-
looking average of exports of goods and nonfactor services (excluding
workers’ remittances) is smaller than or equal to 150 percent. Although
this indicator has benefits, it also may be sensitive to shocks. Suppose, for
example, that there is a peak in terms of exports at some point because of
an increase in some commodity prices. Heavy indebtedness may not be
observed then if the last three years of exports have been strong, but the
country may still be in severe trouble if export prices fall over the next
several years. Given the limitations of the export criterion, especially for
countries with a high export-to-GDP ratio and a sensitivity to terms-of-
trade shocks, the HIPC Initiative added a fiscal criterion of debt sustain-
ability for countries that have an export-to-GDP ratio of at least 30 per-
cent and a government revenue-to-GDP ratio of at least 15 percent. For
HIPCs satisfying both of those thresholds, the HIPC Initiative considers an
additional fiscal criterion: a HIPC’s external debt is sustainable if the ratio
of the present value of public and publicly guaranteed external debt to
government revenues is smaller than or equal to 250 percent.8
Within the enlarged set of MDGs, target 15 is defined to deal compre-
hensively with the debt problems of developing countries through na-
tional and international measures to make debt sustainable in the long
term. The four indicators for this target are (1) the proportion of official
bilateral HIPC debt cancelled, (2) the debt service as a percentage of
goods and services exports, (3) the proportion of official development as-
sistance provided as debt relief, and (4) the number of countries reaching
HIPC decision and completion points.9
Finally, the European Union’s Maastricht Treaty (signed in early 1992)
limited the ratio of government debt to GDP to 60 percent, though it also
was agreed that higher ratios are acceptable as long as the debt-to-GDP
ratio is falling sufficiently over time. Indeed, the majority of European
Union member-states had debt-to-GDP ratios above 60 percent for most
of the 1990s, and at least three countries (Belgium, Greece, and Italy) had
debt-to-GDP ratios of more than 100 percent. In any event, it should be
stressed that the Maastricht Treaty’s debt-to-GDP ratio ought not be in-
terpreted as a debt sustainability indicator, but as convergence criteria set
by a group of European countries that intended to adopt a single curren-
cy by the end of 2001.
We can conclude, therefore, that there are two main criteria to assess
debt sustainability.The first criterion is to look at the external sustainabil-
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ity of a country’s debt. The second criterion is to look at the fiscal sus-
tainability of a country’s debt. Whereas the external criterion compares a
country’s external debt or debt service to its exports, the fiscal criterion
compares a country’s public and publicly guaranteed debt or debt service
to government revenues. The results based on these two categories of
debt sustainability criteria often yield similar results, but external sustain-
ability is neither necessary nor sufficient for fiscal sustainability, and vice
versa.10 The three variables most commonly used as a denominator of a
debt ratio or a debt service ratio are (1) a country’s GDP (or GNP), (2) its
exports, and (3) its government revenues.11
It also must be noted that excluding debt sustainability indicators that
compare a country’s current debt service obligations to variables such as
exports, there are two alternative approaches for defining debt sustain-
ability. The traditional approach compares the nominal stock of disbursed
and outstanding debt to a given macroeconomic variable. The more so-
phisticated approach calculates first the NPV of all future debt service on
disbursed and outstanding debt, and then compares the NPV debt to
some macroeconomic variable (such as GDP, exports, and/or government
revenues). The NPV calculation sums up all future debt service obliga-
tions, whereby future debt service obligations are discounted depending
on when the debt service is due. This is especially important if a country
has a lot of concessional debt. But because the proportion of concessional
debt in Paraguay is relatively low, we will use nominal debt indicators in
this report.12
Theoretical Foundations for the Modules in SimSIP Debt
The SimSIP Debt modules include two simulation worksheets—one for
debt projections and one for assessing the consistency of various debt and
budget deficit scenarios. We discuss both modules in this section.
Debt Projection Module
The Debt Projection Module calculates the values for various debt indi-
cators, based on three modeling elements: (1) the modeling of government
expenditures; (2) the modeling of government revenues; and (3) the spec-
ification of the government deficit, which is financed by new borrowing
after deducting grants and debt relief. Both expenditures and revenues are
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influenced by the level of GDP (Y), which is determined by the previous
year’s level [Y(t – 1)], the projected real growth rate for the year (g), and
the inflation rate (p):
Y(t) = (1 + p (t))(1 + g(t))Y(t – 1). (6.1)
On the expenditure side, the module differentiates between interest
payments on public foreign debt, interest payments on public domestic
debt, principal repayments on foreign and domestic debt, and other gov-
ernment expenditures. The average interest rates (not the interest pay-
ments) on outstanding foreign and domestic debts are exogenously fixed
for any given year by loan contracts, although the module differentiates
between interest rates on public domestic and foreign debt. Given that
new loans (arising from principal repayments and deficit financing) are
generally a small fraction of the debt stock, interest rates on domestic and
foreign debts change only slowly over time. For simplicity, principal re-
payments are financed by new loans, although not necessarily from the
same source (domestic or foreign) and at the same interest rate and ma-
turity. All other expenditures (all expenditures excluding interest and
principal payments) are a predetermined percentage of GDP, although
this percentage rate may change over time.
If we denote the interest rates on domestic and foreign debt by if and id
(averages for the various loan contracts), the stocks of debt by Df(t–1) and
Dd(t–1), and the exchange rate by E(t)—this is the ratio of the value of
domestic to foreign currency—we have three kinds of expenditures: in-
terest payments on foreign government debt [if(t–1) * Df(t–1) * E(t)], in-
terest payments on domestic government debt [id(t–1) * Dd(t–1)], and
government expenditures on social and nonsocial sectors [Gsec(t)] = a (t)
* Y(t). Total government spending is
G(t) = if(t–1) * Df(t–1) * E(t) + id(t–1) * Dd(t–1) + a (t) * Y(t). (6.2)
On the revenue side, we simplify the analysis by combining tax rev-
enues, seigniorage, and all other nontax revenues to one variable, namely
the percentage share [b (t)] of GDP. Changes over time in this percent-
age share reflect changes in tax rates, the efficiency of revenue collection,
and money financing.13 The simulator calculates the intermediate values
based on a linear trend. Grants N(t) and debt service relief DSR(t) are de-
termined exogenously by foreign donors. Like foreign borrowing, grants
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and debt service relief are converted into domestic currency at the end of
each period. If revenues before grants and before debt relief are denoted
by REVbef(t) = b (t) * Y(t), revenues with grants and debt relief are
14
REVaft(t) = b (t) * Y(t) + E(t) * N(t) + E(t) * DSR(t). (6.3)
Budget deficits BD(t) are simply the difference between total revenues
(including grants and debt relief) and total government expenditures:
BD(t) = G(t) – REVaft(t). (6.4)
The module assumes that the government faces no constraints in fi-
nancing expenditures through new borrowing, and the user is free to
choose what share of the new debt comes from domestic sources. If new
domestic and foreign borrowing by the government are denoted, respec-
tively, by BDd(t) and BDf(t), the change in debt is
BD(t) = E(t) * BDf(t) + BDd(t). (6.5)
The simulator makes no assumptions for the impact of new borrowing
on GDP growth, inflation, the exchange rate, and the level of loan con-
cessionality.15 Although the assumptions for GDP growth, inflation, ex-
change rate depreciation, and average interest rates on domestic and for-
eign loans are exogenous variables, the module enables us to adjust the
growth rate of real GDP downward, the inflation rate and the exchange
rate depreciation upward, and the interest rates on domestic and foreign
loans upward the higher the average ratio of government deficit to GDP
is over the projection period. For countries with sustainable poverty re-
duction strategies in place, these considerations are less crucial because
consultations with donors would reduce the existence of excessive fi-
nancing gaps. Combining equations (6.4) and (6.5) yields
G(t) – REVaft(t) = BD(t) = E(t) * BDf (t) + BDd(t). (6.6)
The model is dynamic because the current year’s budget deficit is
linked to the previous year’s budget deficit through the current year’s to-
tal government expenditures, which include interest payments on the
previous year’s debt stock. When the level of debt is known over time, it
is easy to compute the NPV of a country’s public foreign debt by using
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debt-service projections based on the average interest rate and the aver-
age maturity of outstanding public foreign debt. In any case, for a coun-
try’s public domestic debt and a country’s private foreign debt, the NPVs
are set equal to the nominal values.
Deficit-Debt Consistency Module
The Deficit-Debt Consistency Module builds on the theoretical frame-
work of the Debt Projection Module, although it abstracts from the de-
tails of the composition of revenues and expenditures and just looks at
the difference between the current year’s stock of debt [D(t)] and the
previous year’s stock of debt [D(t–1)], which is the current year’s budget
deficit [BD(t)] after grants and after debt relief:
D(t) – D(t–1) = BD(t). (6.7)
As is shown in the SimSIP Debt manual, equation (6.7) can be ex-
pressed in percentages of GDP (denoted by Y ); and for a given set of pa-
rameters, we can derive a simple equation that says the difference be-
tween this year’s and last year’s debt-to-GDP ratios is equal to this year’s
deficit-to-GDP ratio minus a factor k times last year’s debt-to-GDP ratio:
[D(t)/Y(t)] – [D(t–1)/Y(t–1)] = [BD(t)/Y(t)] – k [D(t–1)/Y(t–1)]. (6.8)
Depending on whether we look at the dynamics of the domestic or the
external debt stock, the factor k is defined slightly differently, as shown in
equations (6.9) and (6.10). However, as long as we assume that the share
of domestic and external financing remains constant over time, we can
derive a combined equation that keeps the total public debt-to-GDP ra-
tio constant.
For domestic debt dynamics:
kd = (g+p)/(1+g+p +gp), (6.9)
and for foreign debt dynamics:
kf = (g+p–e)/(1+g+p+gp), (6.10)
where g is the GDP growth rate, p is the inflation rate, and e is the rate of
devaluation.
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Equation (6.8) can be solved to provide the deficit-to-GDP ratio that
keeps the debt-to-GDP ratios constant; that is,
[D(t)/Y(t)] = [D(t–1)/Y(t–1)]. (6.11)
Inserting equation (6.11) into (6.8) yields
[BD(t)/Y(t)] = k[D(t–1)/Y(t–1)]. (6.12)
As shown in the SimSIP Debt manual, equation (6.8) also can be ex-
pressed in NPV terms, which, after some simplifying assumptions and af-
ter keeping the NPV debt-to-GDP ratios constant, results in the follow-
ing equation:
[BD(t)/Y)(t)] = (iold/inew) k[D(t–1)/Y(t–1)], (6.13)
whereby iold is the average interest rate on the previous year’s debt stock,
and inew is the average interest rate on the newly contracted loans.
Extensions of equation (6.8) also allow for the derivation of deficit-to-
GDP ratios that keep the debt-to-exports and the debt-to-revenues ratios
constant, in either nominal or NPV terms.16
Simulations for the Debt Projection Module in Paraguay
Consistent with economic theory, we include Paraguay’s domestic public
and publicly guaranteed debt and exclude Paraguay’s private external
debt for the fiscal sustainability analysis. Moreover, we exclude all domes-
tic public debt and include Paraguay’s private foreign debt for the exter-
nal sustainability analysis.
External Sustainability
To analyze Paraguay’s external debt sustainability, we first note that
Paraguay’s total external debt was estimated in the year 2000 to consist
of $2.234 billion public and publicly guaranteed debt and about $500
million private (nonpublicly guaranteed) foreign debt. For our baseline
scenario, we use the initial conditions and assumptions as displayed in fig-
ure 6.1. Furthermore, we need to make an assumption on the growth rate
of the private foreign debt, which we assume to grow always at the same
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rate as GDP. In this external sustainability analysis, we also assume that
the GDP growth rate gradually increases from 2.5 percent in 2000 to 
5 percent in 2015, and we keep this assumption about GDP growth the
same for all our scenarios.
The different scenarios for this external sustainability analysis are de-
termined by differences in the growth rate of exports. For the baseline
scenario, we assume that exports grow at the same rate as GDP (2.5 per-
cent in 2000 and 5.0 percent in 2015); in a low-export scenario, we as-
sume that the growth rate of exports remains always at 2.5 percent; and
in a high-export scenario, we assume that the growth rate of exports in-
creases gradually from 2.5 percent in 2000 to 8.0 percent in 2015.
The results of these three scenarios are presented in figure 6.2, which
shows an exponentially increasing external debt-to-export ratio for the
low-export scenario, a more or less linear increase in the external debt-to-
export ratio for the baseline scenario, and an initially increasing but then
decreasing external debt-to-export ratio for the high-export scenario. In
any case, we can see that, except for the high-export scenario, Paraguay is
unlikely to achieve long-term external debt sustainability for the initial
conditions and other assumptions as provided in figure 6.1. Again, this
outcome would change if, for example, government revenues were to rise
faster than spending.
Fiscal Sustainability
We analyze Paraguay’s fiscal sustainability by looking at the impact of al-
ternative scenarios on the public debt-to-GDP ratio, the public debt-to-
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Figure 6.1. Initial Conditions and Basic Macroeconomic Assumptions
Source: Authors’ calculations, using SimSIP simulator software.
Note: Pay. = interest payment; Rev. = revenue.
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revenue ratio, and the public debt service-to-revenue ratio. The initial
conditions and basic macroeconomic assumptions are provided in figure
6.1; the assumptions on Paraguay’s domestic public and publicly guaran-
teed debt are shown in figure 6.3. We then modify the macroeconomic
assumptions by considering, first, a pessimistic scenario of 0 percent GDP
growth throughout the projection period and, second, an optimistic sce-
nario of a gradual increase in the GDP growth rate from 2.5 percent in
2000 to 10 percent in 2015. Note that whereas growth in a country de-
pends in part on policy decisions regarding spending, taxation, and debt,
it is defined here in a purely exogenous way to simplify the analysis. Thus
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Figure 6.3. Assumptions on Public Domestic Debt
Source: Authors’ calculations, using SimSIP simulator software.
Figure 6.2. Results of Different Export Growth Scenarios
Source: Authors’ calculations, using SimSIP simulator software.
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there is no feedback to growth from the other variables in the model.
Also, although the simulator enables the user to assess the impact of debt
relief, we do not do this here because Paraguay does not participate in the
HIPC Initiative.
Figure 6.4 presents the results for the three GDP growth scenarios.The
graphs show the evolutions of the debt-to-GDP ratios, the debt-to-rev-
enue ratios, and the debt service-to-revenue ratios for the baseline, pes-
simistic, and optimistic growth scenarios. In the optimistic scenario, the
debt ratios do not increase substantially, whereas they are much higher in
2014 than in 2000 in the baseline and pessimistic scenarios. That is be-
cause, in the assumptions in figure 6.1, we have maintained levels of
spending and revenues that lead to a deficit, and over time, that deficit,
together with interest payments, increases the debt level.
In the graphs presented in figure 6.5 we see the impact of different
evolutions of government revenues and spending, keeping other initial
conditions and assumptions as shown in figures 6.1 and 6.3. The high-
expenditure scenario gradually increases the government’s primary expen-
diture to reach 20 percent of GDP in 2015, leaving the initial percentage
for 2000 unchanged at 18 percent.This implies that the government grad-
ually increases its primary budget deficit (that is, before taking into ac-
count its debt service) to reach 3 percent of GDP in 2015. Alternatively,
the high-revenue scenario gradually increases the revenue-to-GDP ratio
from the initial 17 percent in 2000 to 19 percent in 2015.The gradual in-
crease of the revenue-to-GDP ratio over 15 years suggests that the gov-
ernment will run a decreasing primary deficit for the first 7 years, and the
deficit then will turn into an increasing primary surplus starting in 2008.
However, debt-to-GDP ratios will continue to increase until 2010 be-
cause debt service payments remain.
Comparing the high-expenditure scenario in figure 6.5 with the pes-
simistic scenario in figure 6.4, we can see that the zero growth rate of
GDP has a more detrimental impact on Paraguay’s debt than does the
gradual increase in the share of government expenditures to GDP. On the
other hand, the gradual increase in the share of government revenues to
GDP—from 17 percent to 19 percent—has a more positive effect on
Paraguay’s indebtedness than does the high-growth GDP scenario. Of
course, those conclusions are specific to our assumptions; the reader could
run the simulator with other assumptions.
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Figure 6.4. Results of the Baseline, Pessimistic, and Optimistic Scenarios
a. Impact on debt-to-GDP ratio
d
eb
t-
to
-G
D
P
 r
at
io
 (%
) 100
80
60
40
20
0
year
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
b. Impact on debt-to-revenue ratio
d
eb
t-
to
-r
ev
en
u
e 
ra
ti
o
 (%
) 600
500
400
300
200
100
0
year
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
c. Impact on debt service-to-revenue ratio
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Note that these differences in results are largely due to having kept the
expenditure-to-GDP and the revenue-to-GDP ratios constant in both the
pessimistic and the optimistic scenarios. In reality, changes in growth rates
Source: Authors’ calculations, using SimSIP simulator software.
Note: GDP = gross domestic product.
Figure 6.5. Results of Different Revenue and Expenditure Scenarios
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usually will have an impact on the expenditure and revenue shares. Here
we analyzed the impact of the various changes separately to see the effect
of each parameter change and to show that similar results can be reached
through different parameter changes.
Simulations for the Deficit-Debt Consistency Module 
in Paraguay
We now estimate the level of budget deficit that is consistent with vari-
ous levels of short-run or long-run indebtedness and various growth sce-
narios. The two matrices shown in table 6.1 provide the short-term and
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a. Short-term consistency matrix
GDP growth (%)
Total public 3 4 5
debt/GDP Sustainable deficit
10 0.3 0.4 0.5
20 0.6 0.7 0.9
30 0.8 1.1 1.4
40 1.1 1.5 1.8
50 1.4 1.8 2.3
External public
debt/exports (%) Sustainable deficit
10 1.2 1.3 1.5
20 2.3 2.7 3.0
30 3.5 4.0 4.5
Total public
debt/revenue (%) Sustainable deficit
140 0.7 0.9 1.1
160 0.8 1.0 1.2
180 0.9 1.1 1.4
200 0.9 1.2 1.5
220 1.0 1.4 1.7
b. Long-term consistency matrix
GDP growth (%)
Total public 3 4 5
debt/GDP Sustainable deficit
10 0.1 0.2 0.3
20 0.2 0.4 0.5
30 0.3 0.5 0.8
40 0.4 0.7 1.1
50 0.4 0.9 1.3
External public
debt/exports (%) Sustainable deficit
10 0.1 0.3 0.4
20 0.2 0.5 0.9
30 0.2 0.8 1.3
Total public
debt/revenue (%) Sustainable deficit
140 0.1 0.3 0.5
160 0.1 0.4 0.6
180 0.1 0.4 0.7
200 0.1 0.4 0.7
220 0.2 0.5 0.8
Source: Authors’ calculations, using SimSIP simulator software.
Note: GDP = gross domestic product. Given real GDP growth rates (%), deficit-to-GDP ratios (%) consistent with
various total nominal public debt-to-GDP ratios (%), nominal public external debt-to-export ratios (%), and total
nominal public debt-to-revenue ratios (%).
Table 6.1. Short- and Long-Term Consistency Matrices
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long-term deficit-to-GDP ratios that are consistent with a range of GDP
growth rates and a range of debt-to-GDP ratios, keeping the initial values
and other parameters constant at their short- and long-term values. The
short-term scenario corresponds to the values specified in figure 6.1,
which means that the figures take into account 2000 data. The long-term
scenario is based on the 2015 calculated values of the same parameters in
figure 6.1. In both cases we assume that the share of domestic financing
is kept constant at 12.8 percent and that the interest rate on public do-
mestic debt remains fixed at 13.0 percent.
We can see that the budget deficit-to-GDP ratios for the long-term
analysis are higher than for the short-term analysis, largely because of the
more-than-proportional decrease in the rate of devaluation compared
with the decrease in the inflation rate.17 Recall that the driving force for
the consistency matrix is the factor k, defined in equations (6.9) and
(6.10). If the devaluation and inflation rates would decrease in the same
proportion, there would not be much difference between the short- and
long-term consistent budget deficit-to-GDP ratios. The short- and long-
term deficit-to-GDP ratios that are consistent with a range of GDP
growth rates and a range of debt-to-exports and debt-to-revenue ratios
are also shown in table 6.1. The positive effect of the relatively lower de-
valuation also is visible in the short- and long-term comparisons for these
simulations. Furthermore, we can see that the consistent deficit-to-GDP
ratios for all three short-term analyses are about the same.That is true be-
cause GDP, exports, and revenues all grow at the same rate of 2.5 percent
for the short-term analyses. Conversely, the comparison of the long-term
analyses shows that the consistent deficit-to-GDP ratios are considerably
higher for the external public debt as a share of exports analysis, which
occurs because exports are assumed to grow at 8 percent, compared with
the 5 percent growth rates of GDP and revenues.
Finally, note that when assessing what level of budget deficit is sustain-
able, it is best to rely on the lowest level admissible under the various
debt criteria because the various criteria must more or less be observed,
given that there are good economic rationales for observing each and
every criterion.
As shown in the SimSIP manual, there are a couple other general re-
sults that can be pointed out without running further simulations and
that are worth mentioning here:
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• The higher the real GDP growth rate and the higher the value of a
debt indicator are, the higher is the value of the consistent budget
deficit-to-GDP ratio, though it should be stressed that high debt indi-
cators can lead to a debt overhang and low levels of GDP growth.
• The higher the inflation rate and the lower the devaluation rate are,
the higher is the value of the consistent budget deficit-to-GDP ratio,
though it should be stressed that the two variables usually are moving
in the same direction because higher inflation rates usually suggest
higher devaluations in the future.
• If a country is in the process of obtaining increasingly concessional loan
terms from external creditors, the deficit-to-GDP ratios consistent
with a specific NPV debt indicator and a given growth rate are higher
than with a specific nominal debt indicator. (We did not discuss this
here because our analysis is in nominal terms).
• If GDP and exports grow at the same rate, there will be no difference
between the consistent ranges of deficit-to-GDP ratios for both the
debt-to-GDP ratios and the debt-to-export ratios. Similarly, if GDP
and revenues grow at the same rate, there will be no difference be-
tween the consistent ranges of deficit-to-GDP ratios for both the debt-
to-GDP ratios or the debt-to-revenues ratios.
• The higher the growth rates of exports are, relative to the growth rates
of GDP, the higher are the ranges of consistent deficit-to-GDP ratios
for the debt-to-export ratios, compared with the consistent deficit-to-
GDP ratios for the debt-to-GDP ratios. Similarly, the higher the growth
rates of revenues are, relative to the growth rates of GDP, the higher are
the ranges of consistent deficit-to-GDP ratios for the debt-to-revenues
ratios, compared with the consistent deficit-to-GDP ratios for the debt-
to-GDP ratios. Finally, the higher the growth rates of exports are, rela-
tive to growth rates of revenues, the higher are the ranges of consistent
deficit-to-GDP ratios for the debt-to-export ratios, compared with the
consistent deficit-to-GDP ratios for the debt-to-revenues ratios.
Conclusion
Using alternative macroeconomic assumptions and using the Debt Pro-
jection Module of the SimSIP Debt simulator, we have shown that both
optimistic and pessimistic views on the Paraguay’s future debt sustain-
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ability can be entertained. As in other countries, changes in key parame-
ters tend to have a large impact on sustainability. As our high-revenue
scenario showed, for example, a gradual increase in the share of revenues
to GDP from 17 percent to 19 percent over a period of 15 years (keeping
everything else constant) could lead to a reversal in the otherwise wors-
ening debt ratios in Paraguay. This sensitivity to changes in assumptions
makes it difficult to provide good long-term estimates of a country’s in-
debtedness; but it also shows that, in principle, public action to correct
trends can be implemented, assuming that there is a capacity and the po-
litical will to do so. At the same time, we know that some factors are not
necessarily within the control of governments. For example, changes in
exchange rates are not always related to economic fundamentals, or they
may overshoot fundamentals. When there is a crisis of investor confi-
dence caused by increasing budget deficits, it can trigger first a currency
crisis and then a debt crisis.
This study was written for illustrative purposes, and not for policy sug-
gestions. However, it is worthwhile to recall that, at the time of writing,
there were conflicting views of Paraguay’s debt outlook. That is not too
surprising because debt sustainability is an important topic for develop-
ing countries, and a sensitive one. From a macroeconomic point of view, it
is also an area that must be dealt with very carefully. For example, greater
debt may imply a higher deficit because of the interest expense, and this
may be considered sustainable if high rates of economic growth are fore-
cast. But if those high growth rates do not materialize for some reason, a
country may fall into a debt spiral. When conducting debt analysis, there-
fore, one should be very careful not to use such an analysis to prop up
spending and deficit budgets, even within the context of poverty reduc-
tion strategies that show high levels of need in any given country.
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Notes
1. The SimSIP Debt simulator and its manual are available free of charge on the
World Bank’s SimSIP Web site, http://www.worldbank.org/simsip.
2. We use data until 2000 in this report; the situation has deteriorated further
since then.
3. This share increased from 3.1 percent of GDP in the early 1990s to 7.4 per-
cent in the late 1990s. Even at the end of that decade, only the Dominican
Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Peru had lower levels of spending as a
share of GDP, whereas 11 countries in the study sample of the study had
higher levels of spending; for Honduras, the level of spending was the same as
for Paraguay.
4. This is a sharp increase to the June 2002 debt outlook, which projected the
debt/GDP ratio at about 54 percent.The latest EIU’s debt outlook is available
on the American International Group’s Web site, http://www.aigonline.com.
5. A detailed derivation of the theory underlying the two modules can be found
in the simulator’s Manual, which is available on the Web.
6. Again, we want to emphasize that the assumptions used and the results pre-
sented are for illustrative purposes only and should not be interpreted as the
authors’ own projections for Paraguay. Given the no-charge availability of the
simulator on the Internet, the reader is welcome to simulate Paraguay’s debt
sustainability based on alternative assumptions.
7. For the key issues related to long-term debt sustainability of heavily indebted
poor countries (HIPCs), see Gunter (2001) and IMF and World Bank (2001).
8. For more information, see the World Bank’s HIPC Web site, www.worldbank.
org/hipc/.
9. Please see http://www.undp.org/mdg/ for further information.
10. As Sachs et al. (1999) have pointed out, if debt sustainability is approached
from a human and social development perspective, most of the poorest coun-
tries have an unsustainable debt simply because they have more urgent needs
to reduce poverty than to make debt-service payments.
11. Note that there exists a variety of options for defining each of these three
macroeconomic variables. For example, exports could include or exclude
worker’s remittances, take into account reexports or not, and be based on 
current-year values or be averaged over some time period.
12. There are many options for determining discount rates; and, depending on
user preferences, distinctions can be made in terms of the currency in which
future debt service is payable (for example, the discount rate for the U.S. dol-
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lar or the British pound), the kind of reference rate to use for the discount rate
(for example, the lending rate or the borrowing rate), the time period for the
discount rate (such as the short-term or long-term lending rate), and the peri-
od over which the discount rate is averaged (such as over the last six months
or the last 10 years). Because of the practical and theoretical limitations of us-
ing a complex definition of short-term discount rates to determine long-term
debt sustainability, the SimSIP Debt’s Debt Projection Module uses only one
discount rate, which is flexible over time. As illustrated in more detail in
Gunter (2002), there is no definitive correct or wrong concept of how to de-
fine discount rates. Generally however, using long-term average discount rates
is preferred to avoid changes in the resulting NPV calculations that arise from
marginal and arbitrary short-term changes in discount rates.
13. To avoid negative implications of increased money financing on growth, mon-
ey financing usually is restricted. In general, the noninflationary level of
seigniorage is limited to about 1 percent of GDP.
14. Note that changes in b(t) over time may be occurring because of a natural re-
lationship between taxes and income growth.We do not discuss here whether
tax bases tend to rise proportionately with GDP, less so, or more so; nor do we
estimate the elasticity of spending to GDP.The SimSIP simulator lets the user
choose different values for the key parameters over time.
15. In reality, increased borrowing tends to increase the growth rate of real GDP
up to some critical level (which is difficult to determine), and consistently
high government deficits tend to have negative effects on real GDP growth
and price stability. Depending on the country’s access to foreign concessional
financing, the costs of new borrowing also may increase with a rising fiscal
deficit. At low levels of fiscal deficits, the portion of concessional financing
will be relative high.With rising financing gaps, more and more new loans will
have increased interest rates.
16. See the SimSIP Debt manual for the detailed equations.
17. In Paraguay, the developments of the late 1990s have shown that the rate of
devaluation was persistently above the inflation rate. Although this may be
caused by some catch-up effect from the early 1990s, when devaluations were
considerably smaller than inflation rates, we would expect that the rate of de-
valuation is slightly above the rate of inflation in the long term.
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